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ABSTRACT 
 
The War in the Desert: The Vietnam Antiwar Movement in the American 
Southwest. 
(August 2009) 
Brandon Michael Ward, B.A., Colorado State University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Terry H. Anderson 
 
 The Vietnam antiwar movement developed in the American Southwest 
out of a coalition of Chicanos, GI‟s, and students who agreed that the Vietnam 
War was racist, imperialist, costly, and negatively affected them and their 
communities. The antiwar movement in the Southwest formed in 1967, made 
possible by the emergence of the Chicano and GI movements. Chicanos 
criticized the military for a disproportionate number of Mexican American combat 
deaths in Vietnam. The military sent activist youth from across the country to 
bases in the Southwest, where they protested the war alongside Chicanos and 
college students. Connections between Chicanos, GI‟s, and students developed 
into a strong antiwar movement in 1968-1969. Beginning in 1970, the coalition 
fell apart as Chicanos increasingly pursued a strategy of separatism from 
mainstream American society as the key to self-determination. Frustration over 
perceived lack of progress in ending the war led the antiwar movement into an 
escalation in protest tactics and radicalization of its message, pushing out 
 iv 
moderate voices and further weakening the movement. This thesis offers an 
original contribution because historians have failed to pay attention to the vibrant 
antiwar movement in the Southwest, instead, mostly focusing on the East Coast 
and San Francisco Bay Area. Historians of the Chicano movement have not 
adequately shown how it allied with other movements in the 1960s to achieve its 
goals. The use of underground newspapers allows a window into the writings 
and ideas of the protestors.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST, 1966-1967 
 
 While students at elite universities protested the Vietnam War as early as 
1965, in the Southwest the antiwar movement did not gain much traction.1 The 
pervasive influence of the military-industrial complex, anti-communist politics, 
and most importantly, support for the military by the significant Mexican-
American population stunted the development of an antiwar movement in the 
Southwest. These factors persisted throughout the war, but in 1967, the 
movement broke through and gained momentum, due to the emergence of the 
Chicano movement and the GI movement. The antiwar movement became a 
force for broad social change in the Southwest, connecting American foreign 
policy to problems on the home front. A coalition of Chicanos, GI‟s, and students 
agreed that the lives and resources spent in Vietnam could be put to better use 
in America.2   
 A movement is more than the sum of its individual parts. The antiwar 
movement developed in the Southwest because it provided common ground for 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of The Journal of American History. 
1
   The best works on the antiwar movement include Charles Chatfield with Charles DeBenedetti, 
An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (New York, 1990); Tom Wells, 
The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam (Berkeley, 1994); Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon, 
and the Doves (New Brunswick, 1988); and Lorena Oropeza, ¡Raza Sí¡Guerra No!: Chicano 
Protest and Patriotism During the Viet Nam War (Berkeley,  2005).  
2
   In this essay, I use the term Mexican American to denote broadly all American residents of 
Mexican descent, and it is used without regard to citizenship status. Chicano is used to 
distinguish the younger generation of Mexican Americans with a militant, brown pride ethos.  
 2 
a number of individual social movements. Students, GI‟s, and Chicanos had 
different goals for their activism, but they all agreed that the Vietnam War was 
racist, imperialist, and costly, and it obstructed their own political agendas. The 
groundwork for the antiwar movement was laid in 1966-1967, the interactions 
between movements converged into a strong antiwar movement in 1968-1969, 
and in 1970 the movement started to unravel as the individual groups 
abandoned the antiwar movement to pursue their own struggles. Political 
scientist Charles Tilly defined a social movement as “a sustained interaction in 
which mobilized people, acting in the name of a defined interest, make repeated 
broad demands on powerful others via means which go beyond the current 
prescriptions of the authorities.”3 In the American Southwest, a region notable 
for its lack of organizations and leaders, the antiwar movement was the story of 
the interaction between activists, who were connected by the belief that the war 
negatively affected them and their communities. The movement was at its 
strongest when activists could connect the problems at home to the Vietnam 
War. Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield called the antiwar movement 
the “story of the Vietnam War on the home front.” As “a broad coalition for social 
change,” the antiwar movement was almost always about America first, not 
Vietnam.4   
                                                 
3
    Charles Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics,” in Charles Bright and Susan Harding, 
eds. Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory (Ann Arbor, 1984), 
quote on p. 313; emphasis in the original. See also Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social 
Movements and Contentious Politics, 2
nd
 ed. (Cambridge, UK, 1998).  
4
    Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of 
the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, 1990), 4, 1.  
 3 
 Antiwar movement histories have often claimed to be “national” in scope, 
but their sources have led them to focus only on the most visible aspects of the 
movement. Tom Wells, in The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam, made 
extensive use of the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington 
Post, and interviews with “leaders” of the movement. The result, not surprisingly, 
is a book focused on only the most visible protests and organizations, located 
usually in New York City, San Francisco, and the nation‟s capital. Rhodri 
Jeffreys-Jones‟ Peace Now! argues that the antiwar movement exerted a 
significant influence on American foreign policy.  Rather than attempt a state-by-
state analysis of the movement, Jeffreys-Jones writes the national story of the 
antiwar movement by analyzing just two states, New York and California. He 
chose these states not because they were unique, but because “both states 
were representative of America as a whole in being diverse and cosmopolitan.”5 
Peace Now! represents an extreme example of histories that have attempted to 
tell the story of the national antiwar movement through limited sources. 
Furthermore, even though California is chosen as a focus, Chicanos receive 
only one mention in a state with a noisy and important Chicano movement.  
 The Chicano, GI, and student movements have well-developed 
historiographies.6 Historians, however, have often failed to show how each of 
                                                 
5
  Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Peace Now!: American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam War 
(New Haven, 1999), 6, 59.  
6
  Some notable works on the Chicano movement include Ignacio Garcia, Chicanismo: The 
Forging of a Militant Ethos Among Mexican Americans (Tucson, 1997); Ernesto Chávez,  “Mi 
Raza Primero”: Nationalism, Identity, and Insurgency in the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 
1966-1978 (Berkeley, 2002); and Lorena Oropeza, ¡Raza Sí!¡Guerra No!. 
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these parts interacted in the antiwar movement. Lorena Oropeza‟s important 
¡Raza Sí!¡Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the Viet Nam War 
demonstrated that the Vietnam War was the most important factor driving the 
emergence of the Chicano movement. She argued that the Chicano movement, 
in part due to the Vietnam War, challenged the traditional tripod of Mexican 
American citizenship of masculinity, whiteness, and military service as the key to 
upward mobility. This book has deepened our understanding of the Southwest 
during the Vietnam War as well as the development of the Chicano movement. 
 My goal is not to dispute her findings, but rather to connect Chicano 
protest of the war to the rest of the movement in the Southwest. Oropeza‟s 
findings do not demonstrate how Chicano protest contributed to the larger 
antiwar movement, or how they allied with Anglo students and GI‟s to promote 
their own political causes. Chicanos contributed greatly to the antiwar movement 
in the Southwest, but showing their interactions with GI‟s and student protestors 
will increase our understanding of how individual movements were connected by 
opposition to the Vietnam War.  
 The GI movement, an important element of southwestern antiwar protest, 
similarly has been studied in isolation from other groups making up the 
movement. The first study of the GI movement, David Cortright‟s Soldiers in 
Revolt, is still the best on the subject. Cortright argued that the GI movement, in 
the critical years between 1968 and 1972, practiced the “politics of survival,” and 
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that the evasion of combat was the primary motivation behind GI dissent.7 While 
this accurately characterizes much GI dissent in Vietnam, the story on the home 
front, I argue, was far more complex. This does not explain the involvement of 
the many GI‟s who joined local causes and fought with activists in the base 
communities. They criticized not just the military in Vietnam, but also racism and 
injustice on the home front. Historians have failed to explore the relationship 
between GI‟s and Chicanos in the antiwar movement, which this thesis 
addresses. 
 This thesis considers the Southwest as a region that extends along the 
border states roughly from Fort Hood, Texas to New Mexico, Arizona, and 
Southern California. The combination of a significant Mexican American 
population and a substantial military-industrial complex set this region apart from 
the rest of the United States, and the confluence of these two factors shaped the 
antiwar movement. Underground newspapers form the backbone of the primary 
source research. Histories of the antiwar movement have often been written 
from national newspapers, in the process writing out the movement in the 
Southwest. The best way to study the antiwar movement in the Southwest is 
through the underground press. Studying the antiwar movement from the 
organizational or leadership perspective simply will not work, because few 
movement organizations operated in the Southwest. A mailing list of 
                                                 
7
  Quote in David G. Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: the American Military Today (Garden City, 
1975), 33. Other important works on the GI movement include Andrew E. Hunt, The Turning: A 
History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (New York, 1999) and Richard R. Moser, The New 
Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam Era (New Brunswick, 1996). 
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approximately 1,400 movement organizations in 1973 shows only 109 located in 
the Southwest, and the vast majority of these were in Los Angeles. 8 The 
underground press emerged first in Los Angeles and Austin, and then spread 
into the interior after 1967. The story of a complex, diverse, and active 
movement that mobilized GI‟s, Chicanos, and college students into a coalition 
seeking to end the war in Vietnam and bring social change at home emerges 
from these newspapers. This thesis offers an original contribution with the 
contention that the antiwar movement in the Southwest mobilized the large 
population of Mexican Americans, soldiers, and students into a broad coalition 
seeking to end the war in Vietnam.    
  The antiwar movement emerged out of a unique political, social, and 
economic context in the Southwest. Religious anti-communists interpreted the 
Vietnam War as a spiritual battle, pitting godless communism against a Catholic 
South Vietnamese government. The John Birch Society demanded the 
containment of communism abroad and containment of radicalism on the home 
front, and was especially strong in Texas and southern California.9 The mayor of 
Amarillo, Texas, and a number of congressmen from southern California were 
“Birchers” early in the sixties. Also in Los Angeles, the Christian Anti-Communist 
Crusade was headed by evangelist Fred Schwarz, who led the attack against 
antiwar protestors throughout Southern California. In Texas, Dallas-Fort Worth 
                                                 
8
    “Mailing List of Movement Organizations [1973].” Central Committee of Correspondence. 
Social Movements Collection, Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock.  
9
    Mark Stoll, “Crusaders Against Communism, Witnesses for Peace: Religion in the American 
West and the Cold War,” in Fernlund, ed., The Cold War West (Albuquerque, 1999). 
 7 
became the epicenter in the American West for anti-communism, home to 
oilman H. L. Hunt who ran his “Defender Hour” show on border radio, 
broadcasting a mix of messages that were anti-communist and anti-Semitic. 
Antiwar activists often referred to the difficulty of building a movement in such an 
anti-communist region, usually pointing to the repressive activities of the John 
Birch Society. 
 Conservative groups in the Southwest attempted to stem the emerging 
protest. The anticommunist John Birch Society, headquartered in Orange 
County, California, struggled to maintain 1950s-style Cold War consensus 
amidst a growing counterculture and antiwar movement. “Birchers” attempted to 
block an arts festival in Ventura Country because of its strong countercultural 
content, though the organizer insisted that it was not a hippie fest.10 The society 
attempted to strong-arm city councils into refusing permits for antiwar marches. 
Berkeley‟s underground newspaper the Barb often observed in its pages the 
repressive atmosphere of Orange County, criticizing groups like the John Birch 
Society for creating “culturally deprived millions.”11 While Bay Area had a strong 
antiwar movement by 1967, the Barb criticized the political and cultural 
conservatism of southern California for blunting the movement.  
 In Austin, students at the University of Texas accused the administration 
of interfering with their right to protest the Vietnam War, blaming repression on 
the close relationship between administrators, state politicians, and President 
                                                 
10
    Open City, May 5, 1967, p. 1.  
11
    Berkeley Barb, March 10, 1967, p. 4.  
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Lyndon Johnson. The Texas Student Publications Board of Directors censored a 
student publication in 1966 that caricatured Johnson, fearing that it would insult 
the president, because “after all this is the President‟s University,” as one board 
member declared.12 Students argued that the close relationship between the 
president and the university made demonstrations particularly embarrassing to 
the administrators. The Board of Regents charged that student protests were 
“against the best interests of the University of Texas.”13 The Rag noted that the 
chairman of the university‟s Board of Regents, Frank Erwin Jr., was Johnson‟s 
friend as well as the Texas representative to the Democratic National 
Committee.  
 Prior to the militarily disastrous Tet Offensive in January, 1968, 
“establishment” media sometimes exaggerated pro-war marches and news 
favorable to the Johnson administration, contributing to the popular belief that 
the antiwar movement was a vocal minority.14 A Los Angeles “Support Our 
Servicemen” parade in September, 1967, drew 2,000 onlookers watching a 
march of 450 people reported a Saturday edition of the Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner.15 The following morning, however, the same newspaper inflated the 
original estimates, headlining the front page with “10,000 See Parade in Support 
of GIs,” and estimated 5,000 marchers. The media contributed to the Johnson 
                                                 
12
    The Rag, May 1, 1967, p. 2.  
13
    The Rag, May 1, 1967, p. 2.  
14
    Melvin Small, Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement (New 
Brunswick, 1994), 29. 
15
    Los Angeles Free Press, Sept. 29, 1967, p. 6.  
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administration‟s attempts to paint a rosy picture of the war and marginalize 
antiwar protestors.  
 During the first years of the Vietnam conflict, especially through 1967, 
pro-war demonstrations were commonplace in the Southwest. In San Antonio, 
North side high school students organized a pro-war rally in front of the Alamo, 
which the mayor attended. The San Antonio Inferno resented the rally held by 
the “well-to-do people who live comfortably and enjoy the war in Vietnam. They 
like to read about the bloody jungle fighting while sipping martinis poolside.”16 
Mexican Americans especially resented the organizers who “will undoubtedly be 
sitting out the war in some college while you know who will be doing the 
fighting.”  
 Signs emerged, especially in Austin and Los Angeles, that the antiwar 
movement was ready to break through in the Southwest, due to the recognition 
that the Vietnam War was stealing resources that could better be used at home. 
Johnson‟s political advisors alerted the president in 1967 to the rifts developing 
in Southern California‟s political scene. With an eye towards the 1968 election, 
the president‟s advisors urged him to campaign heavily in Southern California 
and they considered two issues central to winning the state: race and Vietnam. 
Johnson‟s advisors failed to recognize the relationship between the two issues. 
The president could divide the “doves,” they argued, if they emphasized “recent 
great domestic advances with the President. Efforts should be made to 
                                                 
16
    Inferno, June 8, 1967, p. 7. 
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persuade the „doves‟ that the President‟s position on Vietnam is essentially 
moderate and at any rate they should be persuaded to support the President in 
domestic matters even if they continue to disagree on Vietnam.”17 The advisors 
misread the situation separating foreign and domestic affairs was not realistic. 
 The effects of the Vietnam War on the home front turned many former 
supporters of the war into antiwar advocates. Instead of dividing the doves, 
“domestic matters” heightened opposition to the war throughout the Southwest.  
By 1967, it was increasingly apparent that the War on Poverty and the Great 
Society were unsustainable during a war. It was the classic “guns or butter” 
dilemma. Blacks and Chicanos began opposing the war on grounds that it stole 
resources that could be used to combat inner-city problems. In his famous 
speech “Beyond Vietnam,” Martin Luther King, Jr. argued that the burdens of the 
war fell disproportionately on the poor. Despite his high hopes for the War on 
Poverty, “I knew that America would never invest the necessary funds or 
energies in rehabilitation of its poor so long as adventures like Vietnam 
continued to draw onn and skills and money like some demonic destructive 
suction tube.”18 As the war stole resources from the poor, it also sent “their sons 
and brothers and their husbands to fight and to die in extraordinarily high 
proportions relative to the rest of the population.” 
                                                 
17
    “Memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Marvin Watson,” May 10, 1967. Larry Berman 
Collection, Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock.  
18
  Martin Luther King, Jr., “Beyond Vietnam,“ in Clyde Taylor, ed. Vietnam and Black America: 
An Anthology of Protest and Resistance (Garden City, 1973), 79-98, quotes on 81. 
 11 
 Chicanos and blacks throughout the war drew inspiration from King‟s 
criticisms. In an article in the Los Angeles newspaper Open City entitled, “Why 
Blacks Resist the War,” poet Cleveland Harris connected the failures of the War 
on Poverty with the Vietnam War, writing, “The people who vote against fair 
housing, equal employment opportunities, voting rights laws, anti-poverty 
programs and other measures which might benefit the Negro, are identical with 
the ones who say „Bomb Hanoi,‟ „Drop more napalm,‟ „Wipe out the Viet Cong,‟ 
and „We won‟t get out of Vietnam.‟”19 In the inner city, where federal money was 
desperately needed to revitalize blighted areas and bring back jobs, residents 
were sensitive to the broken promises of the War on Poverty, and they blamed 
the Vietnam War for this failure. Antiwar sentiment in Los Angeles developed in 
urban areas almost simultaneously with the suburban colleges, a unique 
situation since the colleges in many parts of the country were the first loci of 
dissent. 
 Efforts to alleviate the ghetto problems were especially intense following 
the summer of 1967, when riots broke out in the urban areas throughout the 
nation. The rioting threatened to undermine support for Johnson‟s Great Society 
as well as the Vietnam War. Congressman Augustus Hawkins joined with nine 
other California Democratic Congressmen to warn, “the crisis of the ghettos is 
more urgent than the war in Vietnam.”20 Hawkins represented the Los Angeles 
neighborhood of Watts, site of the devastating riots in 1965 that caused thirty-
                                                 
19
    Open City, Aug. 17, 1967, p. 3.  
20
    Open City, Aug. 31, 1967, p. 11.  
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four deaths. Historians have argued that the Watts riots divided the black and 
Mexican American communities. Following the riots, federal money poured into 
South Central Los Angeles. Mexican Americans questioned why blacks were 
seemingly rewarded for unruly behavior while their neighborhoods in East Los 
Angeles were ignored by Washington liberals.  By 1967, however, blacks and 
Chicanos increasingly argued that their fates were intertwined, connecting the 
failures of the War on Poverty to the Vietnam War. For blacks and Chicanos, 
protesting the Vietnam War meant promoting the interest of their own 
communities. 
 Urban riots in 1967 heightened the awareness that inner-city problems 
were directly impacted by the Vietnam War. A student-run radio show at the 
University of New Mexico marked the two-year anniversary of the Watts riot. 
Guests of the show included a number of Watts riot participants, who were 
pulling together a Watts‟ Writers Workshop to publish literature from the riot.  
Participants of the interview agreed that a continuum existed between racial 
subjugation at home and colonization of third world people abroad, especially 
the Vietnamese. The Vietnam War had become a “Frankenstein” for the United 
States, insisted Vallejo Ryan Kennedy, “but they can‟t kill him, because his 
image in the eyes of the world would be bad, so he‟s got to pacify and quiet his 
Frankenstein down. See? But Frankenstein keeps growing bigger every day.”21  
                                                 
21
    “Transcript of a Discussion at the Duglass House,” Social Movements Collection, Virtual 
Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock.  
 13 
The other participants agreed, connecting the pacification of the Vietnamese 
with the pacification of minorities in America. 
 Connection of urban riots to the Vietnam War is also evident in María 
Herrera-Sobek‟s “Cinco poemas.” While white people with power lounged in 
segregated country clubs and sent minorities to war, she wrote, “a bomb was 
planted/ in our minds/ a bomb exploded/ Watts, East Los/ Black Panthers/ 
Brown Berets/ Drank the night/ and lighted up the sky/ with homemade/ 
fireworks/ the war had come/ to roost/ in our own backyard.”22  
  The desert Southwest is marked by vast spaces interrupted by urban 
oases and military installations. It is not surprising, then, that the antiwar 
movement would emerge in the inner cities and military bases. The Fort Hood 
Three was the first public instance of GI dissent against the Vietnam War. Three 
soldiers finished their basic training in June, 1966, at Fort Hood in Killeen, 
Texas, and then refused orders for deployment to Vietnam.23 They included a 
white, a Puerto Rican, and an African American, giving the sense that this was a 
sample of the composition of the American military. David Samas, Dennis Mora, 
and James Johnson challenged the constitutionality of the war in a lawsuit filed 
against the government.24 In a joint statement, they rejected the prospect for 
being pawns of American imperialism, “We oppose the criminal waste of 
                                                 
22
       Maria Herrera-Sobek, “Cinco poemas,” first published in George Mariscal, ed. Aztlán and 
Viet Nam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War (Berkeley, 1999), 232-235, quote on 
234. 
23
    Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, 155. 
24
    Terry H. Anderson, “The G.I. Movement and the Response from the Brass,” in Melvin Small 
and William Hoover, ed., Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement 
(Syracuse, 1992), 93-115, 95.  
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American lives and resources. We refuse to go to Vietnam!!”25  The three were 
court martialed and sentenced to prison in the stockades at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, where they stayed until October, 1967. Although this was a much-
publicized event, it was downplayed by much of the press as the actions of a trio 
of disgruntled young men. While laying some important groundwork for the GI 
movement, the event did not spark a movement of followers. A movement 
required more than a sporadic protest to create momentum. 
 Fort Hood regained the national spotlight in May, 1967, when military 
officials court martialed Pfc. Howard Petrick for his antiwar activities.26 While on 
a ten-day pass, Petrick attended the Young Socialist Alliance convention in 
Detroit, and upon returning, discovered that his locker had been searched and 
his radical literature confiscated. This was an apparent response to Petrick 
passing out literature on everything from Vietnam to Malcolm X. Petrick received 
a dishonorable discharge for his membership in the Socialist Workers Party.27 
The Committee to Defend the Rights of Pfc. Howard Petrick sought an 
honorable discharge, arguing that soldiers retain first amendment rights. 
Petrick‟s case raised a significant question: does a civilian lose his or her 
constitutional rights upon entering the military? This was the central organizing 
question for the GI movement during the Vietnam War. Some historians have 
                                                 
25
   Statement of the Fort Hood Three reprinted in “We Demand Freedom for GI‟s,” in G. Louis 
Heath, ed., Mutiny Does Not Happen Lighly: The Literature of the American Resistance to the 
Vietnam War (Metuchen, NJ, 1976), 150-154, quote on 152. 
26
    The Rag, May 8, 1967, p. 8. 
27
    “Defend the Right of GIs to Free Speech,” Social Movements Collection, Virtual Vietnam 
Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock.  
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painted the movement as though soldiers were only concerned with avoiding 
combat in Vietnam. The first scholar of the GI movement, David Cortright, 
argued that the movement boiled down to the “politics of survival.”28 While true 
in a narrow sense, it mischaracterizes the intellectual content of their protests 
and their broad attacks on American racism, imperialism, and militarism, 
especially important in the Southwest. The war deployed a generation of activist 
youth from across the nation to bases throughout the Southwest, where they 
engaged with the local communities to fight for positive social change. In the 
process, they gave legitimacy to the growing antiwar movement in its ability to 
protest the war. Fort Hood became the epicenter of the GI movement in the 
Southwest, built on the foundations of the Fort Hood Three and Howard Petrick. 
 In the Southwest, the military-industrial complex dominated politics and 
the economy, and became an early target of activists. Chicanos found in the 
military-industrial complex an enticing target, because the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
held corporations with federal contracts to a higher standard of integration and 
equality. Still, fears that their jobs were at risk if they defied the corporations or 
the military bases subdued the efforts. An editorial in the San Antonio Inferno 
expressed why workers and Mexican Americans were not mobilizing against the 
war: “Mexican American civil service workers at the five major military 
installations…believe war is good business. But in their patriotic zeal and in their 
newly acquired affluence, they are receiving a poor return on the investment of 
                                                 
28
    David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt, 33. 
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their sons.”29 The San Antonio underground the Inferno sarcastically 
congratulated Kelly Air Force Base on its anniversary: “Happy 50th Anniversary 
Kelly Air Force Base: „Fifty years of discrimination against Mexican 
Americans.‟”30 The newspaper lobbed criticism of racism not only at the base, 
but also at the surrounding military industries in San Antonio.  
 Chicano protest of the war began in earnest in 1967, fueled by the 
inequities of the draft system and the disproportionate Mexican American deaths 
in Vietnam. Sociologist Ralph Guzmán at the University of California - Santa 
Cruz found that “a disproportionate number of young men with distinctive 
Spanish names did not return from the Southeast Asia theatre of war.”31 
Guzmán‟s findings were significant in part because the military did not 
specifically track Mexican Americans, but classified them as white. Data had to 
be inferred by Spanish surnames. In the Southwest, Guzmán found that 
between 1961 and 1967, 16.4 percent of all the killed  soldiers in Vietnam had 
Spanish surnames, while they made up 11.0 percent of the general population in 
the 1960 census. Guzmán merely confirmed what Chicanos already suspected, 
that Mexican Americans carried an unfair share of the burden of fighting.  
Chicanos began arguing that they should fight for the raza, often translated as 
“the race” or “the people,” an appeal that grew throughout the war as the 
Chicano Movement developed. 
                                                 
29
   Inferno, Feb. 29, 1968, pp. 3-4, quote on p. 3.   
30
   Inferno, May 11, 1967, p. 2. 
31
  Ralph Guzmán, “Mexican American Casualties in Vietnam.” Douglass Pike Collection: Unit 03 
-Statistical Date. Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive, Lubbock.  
 17 
 Chicanos blamed the draft for targeting their communities. The 
newspaper El Malcriado summarized the situation, “Southwestern states have 
disgraceful records when it comes to Mexican Americans and the draft….”32 Of 
the Southwestern states, only New Mexico had Mexican American 
representation on draft boards proportionate to the population. While comprising 
14.8% of the population in Texas, they only made up 5.3% of draft board 
members.  In the Rio Grande Valley, not a single Mexican American sat on a 
draft board.  An advertisement for Chicano Draft Counseling office in San Diego 
announced the defiance of one young Chicano, “In Honor of My Mother, I Won‟t 
Go!”33 The advertisement suggested why an East Los Angeles native, Jose 
Sanchez, was resisting the draft, “I am fighting my war . . . here at home.” The 
Chicano Draft Counseling organization accused the war of “wiping out the young 
men of the brown community in the Southwest at an alarming pace.” Criticizing 
middle-class Anglo draft resisters, an Albuquerque paper opined, 
“REMEMBER In New Mexico, every time a gringo escapes the draft by going 
to the University…a Chicano gets drafted!”34  
 Draft evasion was popular with middle-class youth, but blacks and 
Chicanos pointed out that they did not have the same opportunities to obtain 
deferments. Middle-class students had access to the medical deferments, draft 
counseling, and fellow draft resisters that allowed them to avoid combat and let 
                                                 
32
    Story reprinted in Inferno, Nov. 23, 1967, p. 2.  
33
   “La Verdad,” Chicano Yearbook 1968, p. 66.  
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the burden of fighting fall on the working class.35 While draft evasion was 
common throughout the United States, in the Southwest its loudest critics were 
blacks and Chicanos. Draft evaders, blacks and Chicanos noticed, were often 
privileged, college-bound, middle-class whites. In the Los Angeles area, of 
thirteen draft counseling offices listed by the underground newspaper Open City, 
only two specifically served the South Central or East Los Angeles sections of 
the city, home to the majority of blacks and Chicanos.36 Levi Kingston, chairman 
of the Freedom Draft Movement, summarized why blacks and Chicanos needed 
anti-draft resources, “The white middle class isn‟t affected by this war. It‟s the 
minority groups.”37 Although an exaggeration, Kingston reflected the sentiments 
of many minorities. A number of draft counseling offices operated throughout the 
Southwest aimed specifically at blacks and Chicanos, but these efforts often 
could not treat the basis of the problem racism and poverty.  
 Although criticisms of the war became more common throughout the 
Southwest, protests and marches were sporadic and sparsely attended. Critics 
of the war were isolated, blacks and Chicanos lobbed their own condemnations 
of the war, students mostly organized amongst themselves, and the GI 
movement was not yet on anyone‟s radar. An important turning point occurred in 
the fall of 1967 in Los Angeles, as blacks, Chicanos, students, and other critics 
of the war participated in the massive national Stop the Draft Week, beginning 
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on October 16 and climaxing five days later with a rally. While most of the 
Southwest was quiet during the week, it established common ground between 
Chicano struggles and the antiwar movement that would later be important 
throughout the region. Protestors picketed the L.A. Induction Center, the sole 
military induction point for Southern California. They marched on the Federal 
Building, burning draft cards and induction papers. Colleges and high schools 
staged walk-outs, antiwar business owners shut down shops for the day, and 
protestors picketed draft board members‟ businesses and homes.38 One 
historian argues that “Stop the Draft Week was a prologue to the explosions of 
1968,” because of its participation by a diverse assortment of “middle-class 
liberals, student radicals, hippies, civil rights workers, black power advocates, 
Vietnam veterans,” and others.39  
 Los Angeles Stop the Draft Week connected the antiwar movement to 
Chicano struggles in the Southwest. Festivities kicked off at East Los Angeles 
College Stadium, in the Mexican-American community.40 Reies Tijerina, leader 
of the revolt by New Mexico hispanos to reclaim land grants, headlined the rally. 
Other notable speakers included Rodolfo “Corky” Gozales of Denver‟s Crusade 
for Justice, Mary Clarke from Women Strike for Peace, Frank Greenwood of the 
Los Angeles Black Congress, and comedian Dick Gregory.41 El Teatro 
Campesino, the farm workers‟ “Peasant Theatre” provided entertainment. The 
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crowd numbered in the thousands, the largest turnout for an antiwar event 
anywhere in the Southwest to that point.42 Tijerina and Gonzales connected the 
struggles of Chicanos in the Southwest to the war in Vietnam. Gonzales 
charged, “The war in Vietnam is only an extension of the same conditions that 
exist here against the minorities. The young cats in the barrios…are fighting for 
their self-determination.”43 It was the first time that struggles in the Southwest 
were fused with the national antiwar movement. 
 Antiwar activism in the Southwest was ignored by the mainstream press, 
a problem that remained throughout the war, leading to the still-prevalent belief 
that nothing significant occurred there.44 The emergence of the underground 
press, then, was important to building an antiwar movement, because it offered 
movement participants an outlet to report their own activities and successes. A 
riot at Fort Hood on 3 October 1967 almost went unreported. The Berkeley Barb 
broke the story a full month later acting on a tip from “Scotty Frame,” a private 
stationed at the base.45 The 198th Light Infantry Brigade rioted on October 3rd, 
the night before they were scheduled to leave for Vietnam. Rioters nearly beat to 
death a second lieutenant with the military police. The extent of the damages or 
the number of rioters arrested was not reported by the military. Fort Hood brass 
downplayed the event, calling it a “beer brawl,” and Pentagon spokesmen 
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denied that anything rowdy had occurred.46 Colonel Robert Berens said that a 
minor fracas started when beer sales were ended early at an event. The 
“psychedelic press” exaggerated the incident, Berens claimed. An anonymous 
official at the base leaked to the Rag that a riot of 250 men had indeed occurred, 
but officials continued to publicly deny the event.47 The brass told the Austin-
American that “nobody was angry about going to Vietnam.”48  
 Students began protesting the military-industrial complex throughout the 
Southwest in 1967, made possible by the emergence of the underground press. 
Students did not need to leave campus to find evidence of the Vietnam war 
making machine. Through their newspapers, students alerted their communities 
to the influence of the military and defense industries on campus. Perhaps no 
company better represented what the students found despicable about the war 
than the Dow Chemical Company. Best known for its napalm product, or 
“Johnson‟s Baby Powder,” as protestors called it, napalm was a petroleum jelly 
bomb that ignited when dropped from planes, engulfing its victims in flames. 
Dow sent career recruiters to the University of California - Los Angeles, 
prompting a group of students to demand that the university ban representatives 
from the war industries.  Students and faculty at the University of Texas 
demonstrated outside of a room where a Dow recruiter was conducting 
interviews. One protestor hoped to “get people to think about the effect of 
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napalm on women and children in Vietnam.”49 A philosophy graduate student at 
UCLA covered his arm with homemade napalm and lit himself on fire, wanting 
“to experience what the Vietnamese people had to go through,” while, hundreds 
of demonstrators forced a Dow job recruiter to lock himself in a coffee room.50 
Students circled a petition seeking in jest to award the president of the Dow 
company with a Degree of Humane Letters. Students promised more 
demonstrations if the university did not cancel planned visits by recruiters from 
the Air Force, General Research Corporation, Litton Industries, and the CIA. 
Administrators at California State University - Los Angeles blamed the Black 
Student Union for a demonstration that drew 300 people and forced two Dow 
recruiters to flee through a window.51 Police arrested thirteen students and three 
faculty members for disturbing the peace and inciting to riot.  
 Efforts against Dow spilled off campus, as students allied with concerned 
members of the local community. Los Angeles activists planned what they 
expected to be the biggest demonstration against Dow to date, the ”Peace on 
Earth Now!” parade, rallying outside the Torrance city hall and then marching to 
Dow‟s napalm plant.52 A newsstand operator predicted that the march would 
turn violent, “There will be trouble because most of the kids around here are 
proud to be Americans. These peace people aren‟t.”53 Torrance police advised 
the group to expect strong resistance from groups with “adverse philosophical 
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ideals.”54 Pro-war demonstrators attempted to disrupt the march, but motorcycle 
police effectively guarded the marchers, reportedly confiscating over 100 
weapons from the hawkish crowd.55 The Los Angeles Times exaggerated the 
success of the pro-war factions in disrupting the event, but the scuffles primarily 
took place among the hawks as a fight erupted between Young Americans for 
Freedom and the Nazis.56  Anti-Dow activities exasperated company president 
Herbert Doan, who called the matter “a stinking, lousy, goddamn mess.”57 
Several board members advocated ending napalm production immediately, but 
were outvoted.  
It was a noisy ending to a year that began with little antiwar protest in the 
Southwest. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE RISING TIDE OF PROTEST, 1968-1969 
 
 Between 1968 and 1969, the antiwar movement capitalized on the growth 
of dissent in the Southwest, made possible by the expansion of the Chicano 
movement and the emerging GI movement. The emergences of GI 
coffeehouses and underground newspapers in 1968 were the most important 
factors in creating a GI movement. The Oleo Strut in Killeen, Texas, was the 
third GI coffeehouse to open, serving the nearly 40,000 men and women 
stationed at Fort Hood.58 Oleo Strut opened in June, 1968, during the “Summer 
of Support,” as the GI movement drew the attention of civilians and the military. 
The coffeehouse served several functions: it offered soldiers a place to relax, 
drink coffee (no alcohol was permitted in this dry town), browse the library of GI 
and antiwar newspapers, discuss politics, and learn about movement 
demonstrations and activities.59  
 Members of the local community and military base leadership resisted the 
creation of the press and coffeehouses. The Oleo Strut faced severe 
harassment by local and military authorities. Customers complained that they 
were monitored, illegally searched, and stereotyped as drug users. Fort Hood‟s 
Major William Friend, a staff member of the commanding general, belied his own 
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ignorance of the GI movement and the objectives of the Oleo Strut, stating, “We 
really don‟t know what it‟s about except that it‟s a hippie joint, and hippies are 
sort of destructive, I guess you could say.”60 Members of the Killeen community 
charged that the Oleo Strut was a drug haven and at times physically harassed 
its customers. Oleo Strut opened its doors in July and staged a “love-in“ in the 
town park on Independence Day. A group of “cowboys ….spurred on by the 
Killeen cops” broke up the celebration.61 This was a common refrain from the 
customers, complaining that they faced harassment by a group of “local toughs” 
who called themselves “cowboys” and interfered with coffeehouse-sponsored 
activities.62 Local police tried but failed to get the coffeehouse‟s lease revoked.63 
Managers tried to dissuade customers from bringing drugs into the bar, fearing 
that authorities could raid the store and use this evidence to shut down the shop.  
 Military officials took note of the burgeoning GI movement, particularly at 
Fort Hood. A Counter-Intelligence Brief by the Naval Investigative Service Office 
in San Diego directed Navy and Marine Corps commanders to be vigilant 
against antimilitary propaganda.64 The memo instructed commands to confiscate 
the San Francisco-based GI newspaper the Bond and forward it to the Naval 
Investigative Service, along with any other information available about the 
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recipient. Despite a June Counter-Intelligence Brief reporting that establishment 
of GI coffeehouses was a “pipe dream,” the August memo noted that the 
Summer of Support “is achieving some of its goals.” It then reprinted in its 
entirety a June Wall Street Journal article describing the Oleo Strut coffeehouse 
and GI activism at Fort Hood. Despite their best efforts, military brass could not 
undermine the movement through court-martials or deploying soldiers to 
Vietnam, in part because they did not understand where the dissent originated. 
Oleo Strut volunteers wrote to Houston‟s Space City News, a movement 
newspaper, claiming, “The brass didn‟t understand that the movement doesn‟t 
grow out of leaders,“ they argued, “but rather it flows from the real oppression of 
men and women in the army.”65 Army brass at Fort Hood attempted to limit the 
influence of Oleo Strut on the GI‟s by ordering their soldiers to avoid the 
coffeehouse. Military officials at Fort Hood told the Dallas Morning News that the 
rumors of widespread disorder were exaggerations. They defended their 
attempts at eliminating drug use, claiming that officers and noncommissioned 
officers were trained in identifying marijuana during inspections. “We go so far 
as to light up a marijuana cigarette to let them smell it, so they will know what 
they are looking for,” said Colonel Robert Carpenter.66  
 The emergence of the GI movement was on full display during the 
October 1968 demonstrations in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Peace Action 
Council demanded that Americans should “Defend Those Who Resist the Draft! 
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Support GI‟s Who Oppose the War, Support Our Servicemen in Vietnam, Not 
Those Who Send Them There!”67 One of the Fort Hood Three, David Samas, 
spoke at the rally, one day after being released from serving his prison sentence 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A number of pro-war demonstrators attempted to 
disrupt the rally. A group calling itself the Westlake Patriots donned Nazi 
uniforms and carried signs that read “Victory in Vietnam” beneath swastika 
symbols.  
 The development of an underground press at many college towns gave 
students the power to fight the university-military complex and connect with the 
Mexican American community and nearby bases. At many colleges in the 
Southwest, students targeted compulsory Reserve Officer Training Corps 
programs. At the University of Arizona, an editorial in the Bandersnatch 
newspaper questioned why ROTC remained compulsory when the military‟s own 
research found that voluntary programs could meet the demand.68 At the New 
Mexico A&M University, the Conscience reported that the American Civil 
Liberties Union was willing to support any freshman or sophomore willing to 
resist mandatory ROTC.69 Students at the university voted more than two-to-one 
in favor of voluntary ROTC in 1967, though the measure was merely symbolic. 
The ROTC had its supporters on campus, however, and at the University of 
California at Santa Barbara a group called Friends of the ROTC was organized 
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by the Military Science program and enjoyed support from the John Birch 
Society.70 Military officials fiercely defended the programs as crucial to meeting 
their manpower needs.  
 Students in the Southwest targeted mandatory ROTC as the most overt 
overreach of military authority in the universities. At New Mexico A&M 
University, students pressured the Board of Regents into investigating the 
abolishment of mandatory ROTC. Students were not very sanguine about their 
chances of success, and suggested that “we will have to abolish mandatory 
ROTC ourselves.”71 The students were probably encouraged by signs from the 
ACLU that it was willing to legally assist students in challenging the legality of 
mandatory ROTC.72 The Conscience suggested that sophomores and incoming 
freshmen should be organized and the ACLU contacted. Anti-ROTC actions had 
some success in the Southwest. At Arizona State University, many 
administrators sided with the students, slashing the budget for military-related 
activities, and no longer funding ROTC activities with student fees.  Students 
argued that this early success should not forestall further protests: “An attack on 
ROTC is an integral part of the anti-imperialist struggle and the program on the 
campus.”73  
 The presence of military-related research on the campuses offended 
many students. The Rag instructed incoming freshmen to be wary of the military 
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presence on campus, as represented by recruiters, the ROTC, funding from the 
defense industries, and administrators with ties to the federal government.74 
After NBC news corporation reported that Fort Huachuca engaged in biological 
and chemical warfare training, students at the nearby University of Arizona 
demanded to know whether the university was engaging in weapons research. 
Student investigators encountered resistance from the university. Unable to 
prove that the university engaged in researching chemical and biological 
weapons, they still concluded that a close relationship between the Department 
of Defense and the university merited student opposition. The efforts did not 
bear results. The millions of dollars invested by the military and defense 
corporations proved far more powerful than student dissent.  
 Chicano rejection of the war facilitated the penetration of the antiwar 
movement into the interior of the Southwest, especially Arizona, New Mexico, 
and South and West Texas, fueled by Chicano sociologists discovering a 
disparity between the size of minority populations and their rate of deaths in 
Vietnam. Even though these numbers leveled off by the end of the 1960s, the 
perception persisted that blacks and Chicanos bore a disproportionate burden of 
the fighting. Throughout the war, it remained a powerful metaphor that 
connected the military‟s treatment of minorities at home and subjugation of Third 
World people abroad. Reies Lopez Tijerina stated, “I will not go to die in 
                                                 
74
    Rag, Sept. 15, 1969, pp. 8-9, and 14. 
 30 
Vietnam I am going to die here in San Joaquin.”75  This became a common 
refrain of Chicano protestors that it is better to fight for la raza than die in 
Vietnam.  
 In a conversation published in the Chicano journal El Grito, Johnny, a 
disabled Chicano veteran, talks to a group of men from his hometown in San 
Jose, California.76 One of the men, Trini, asks if there were other Chicanos in his 
company, and Johnny responds that he was one of sixteen in a company of one 
hundred. “Why do you ask that, Trini?“ Trini responds, “Oh some Chicanos were 
passing out leaflets around here that said where Chicanos were 9% of the 
population in California and that 21% of the Vietnam dead were Chicanos.” 
Referring to the heavy burden of fighting placed on minorities, Johnny snaps: 
“Well, that ain‟t nothing. There were about twenty-five Negros in that company I 
was in. All dead, except one. There were some Puerto Riqueños too, about four 
or five. About half of the company was Negros and Latinos.”  
 The San Diego Free Press announced at the beginning of 1969 that the 
movement was ready to challenge “militaristic, racist, exploitative and arrogant” 
San Diegans.77 The emergence of an antiwar movement in this military town 
was made possible by the growth of the GI movement. The end of the San 
Antonio Inferno, however, could be taken as a warning of the difficulty of running 
an underground newspaper in a military town. In early 1969, editor of one of the 
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first Chicano newspapers, Tom Cahill, was forced to shut down the Inferno after 
running afoul of the Mexican American community by criticizing the war and the 
Johnson administration.78 Much of the Mexican American community drew 
paychecks from one of the four Air Force bases or the two Army bases. 
Protesting the Vietnam War was bad business for the Inferno. The draft 
counseling office of the San Antonio Committee to Stop the War closed down in 
January after only six months due to lack of money. Members of the dwindling 
peace movement in San Antonio lamented the prospects for future activism. 
 The GI movement, by necessity, engaged with the local community for 
support in the form of activist allies as well as financial donations. The Los 
Angeles GI newspaper Up Front thanked the local Women Strike for Peace 
chapter for its financial assistance, but begged further civilian support, because 
“we as GIs have very little we can contribute financially.”79 As at Fort Hood, a 
stable system of support in the community was necessary to sustaining the GI 
movement. Coffeehouses and newspapers provided continuity in the movement, 
despite the high turnover of military personnel. Women Strike for Peace made 
efforts to secure a GI coffeehouse in San Diego.80 Seeking assistance from 
coffeehouses in Los Angeles and San Francisco, they argued that San Diego 
desperately needed an outlet for activism, as it was a bigger military center than 
either of those cities.  
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 In August, 1969, protestors organized a demonstration at “Nixon‟s 
Summer White House,” his home in San Clemente, California, making several 
demands: “No sanctuary for Nixon. Bring all the troops home now. End the war 
in Vietnam. Self-determination for the Vietnamese, Blacks, Browns, Indians.”81 
The PAC advertised that the march would be led by GI‟s and veterans, who 
should be willing to fight for minorities at home. “While tens of thousands of our 
brothers Blacks and Browns are sent to Vietnam to kill and be killed in a 
racist war, politicians continue to use unlawful violence, and shout the 
hypocritical cry for ‟law and order.‟” Students were also well-represented at the 
rally, where they asked for support for “quality education not ROTC to kill friends 
and neighbors,” and an end to “Pentagon subsidized war-research projects on 
our nation‟s campuses.” The march emphasized the brotherhood of minorities, 
GI‟s, and students, under the catch-all banner of self-determination as the key to 
freedom. 
 One outcome of the efforts at GI-Chicano interaction was the degree to 
which GI‟s supported strikes by farm workers in the Southwest. Leaders of the 
migrant labor strikes struggled to find ways to connect their struggles in a 
meaningful way to the rest of the nation. For most people, the plight of the farm 
laborers was a distant issue. The United Farm Workers in 1969 were in the 
midst of a strike against the grape farmers and promoted a nationwide boycott of 
the fruit. In June, 1969, the Department of Defense admitted to the Los Angeles 
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Times that it was a major purchaser of “scab” grapes, sending two million 
pounds to Vietnam in the first half of 1969.82 The union charged that the massive 
military purchases of “dumped California grapes” could only have been done 
under orders from the federal government to break the strike. Although the 
strikers could never prove that the military consciously used its purchasing 
power to bail out the grape growers, the charge was damning. GI‟s took up the 
farm workers‟ cause, publishing the reports in their underground newspapers. 
An article in the Long Beach Free Press, “Grapes of War,” reported that the 
Pentagon undermined the efforts of the California grape strike by buying 
enormous quantities of grapes and sending them to South Vietnam.83    
 The October Moratorium provided a united front against the war, and in 
many ways was a climax of cooperation and participation by Chicanos, blacks, 
GI‟s, students, and civilians. It was one of the few moments during which 
Chicanos and GI‟s were consciously integrated into the events. Cesar Chavez, 
in one of his few statements about the antiwar movement, supported the 
moratorium, stating, “There is no chance of achieving full participation of all of 
our citizens in our own system here in America so long as our government is 
preoccupied with interfering in the affairs and aspirations of poor people around 
the world. I, therefore, hope that all Americans will join in and support the 
activities of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee.”84 Los Chicanos, a moderate 
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Mexican American student group at New Mexico A&M, issued a statement 
supporting the Moratorium, arguing that ending the war would allow the nation to 
“focus its resources to correcting the problems at home.” At Arizona State, a list 
of organizations supporting the Moratorium attest to the inclusiveness of the 
event, including Young Democrats, Mexican-American Liberation Committee, 
Black Student Union, Student Peace Association, and Students for a Democratic 
Society. The Moratorium at California State University - Long Beach, included 
black and Chicano speakers at the rally, several of whom argued that the real 
fight was in the ghettos and barrios and not in the jungle. At Austin, events drew 
a number of participants and speakers from Fort Hood.85 New Mexico A&M 
students considered the Moratorium the first major antiwar action at the 
university.86 The Board of Regents, the President, and deans at the University of 
New Mexico publicly supported the Moratorium, the earliest instance of 
administrators at a major southwestern university supporting an antiwar stance 
by students. 
 Some antiwar protestors remarked that the Moratorium represented a 
turning point. The lack of response by the federal government to the demands of 
the antiwar movement frustrated Long Beach activists into declaring that “the 
anti-war movement no longer engages in symbolic acts.”87 Momentum from the 
October Moratorium spilled into November, when many communities organized 
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more protest actions. The November Moratoriums may have been more 
important than the October demonstrations. At Arizona State, November 
Moratorium organizers sought to bring more Chicanos and GI‟s into the events. 
The Druid Free Press remarked that the “November Moratorium in Tucson 
extends beyond the University to Tucson‟s schools and the community at 
large.”88 A Brown Beret spoke at the events and a vigil was held at Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base in an effort to more actively engage with the community 
at large. Police estimated that 5,000 attended the events in Tucson and about 
400 at Davis-Monthan.89 The nation‟s largest rallies at San Francisco and 
Washington, D.C were out of reach for most southwesterners, especially for the 
GI‟s. Local protests allowed activists to connect the Vietnam War to problems in 
their own communities. The November San Diego Moratorium included black, 
brown, GI, and student speakers, and concluded with a vigil at the Navy‟s 
hospital. The moratorium was a cross-section of the San Diego community and 
included symbolic attacks against the military locally.90 The San Diego Free 
Press remarked at how it was the largest procession through the streets by 
antiwar protestors in the city‟s history, a stark contrast to the military revues that 
often paraded through the downtown.91 
 The November Moratorium was an opportunity for GI‟s for Peace, one of 
the most important GI organizations to emerge in the Southwest, to demonstrate 
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its power. GI‟s for Peace was founded on August 17, 1969, when a number of 
Fort Bliss soldiers gathered at El Paso‟s McKelligan Canyon “to proclaim the 
following purposes: to promote peace, secure constitutional rights for 
servicemen, combat racism, improve enlisted living conditions, and provide aid 
to the local Chicano community.”92 Gigline was its underground newspaper. The 
organization‟s founding principles suggested its recognition that success 
depended on establishing connections with the local community, especially the 
importance of cooperation with minorities in the community. Historian David 
Cortright suggested that it was this broad social mission that helped GI‟s for 
peace avoid the radical-versus-moderate factionalism that later plagued many 
organizations. The Army attempted to rid the base of the organization, deploying 
Paul Nevins, its first chairman, and many other supporters to Vietnam. Activities 
at the November Moratorium included a protest at the site of the usual Veterans 
Day parade in El Paso. It was one of the largest demonstrations by GI‟s during 
the nationwide November Moratorium. In the New York Times on Sunday, 
November 9, 1969, a full-page ad appeared with the signatures of 1,366 active-
duty servicemen announcing support for the Moratorium and opposition to the 
war. 141 GIs from Fort Bliss signed the statement. It was a major moment for 
the antiwar movement in the Southwest. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE UNRAVELING, 1970-1972 
 
 The antiwar movement began to unravel in 1970. The strong showings by 
the 1969 Fall Moratoriums also contained within them the seeds for destruction. 
The Chicano movement took the antiwar movement‟s message of self-
determination and began pursuing its own strategies for ending the war, 
culminating in the massive Chicano Moratorium in Los Angeles in 1970. An 
escalation in the confrontational tactics and rhetoric of militant Brown power and 
the students‟ turn towards violence turned off many moderates in the antiwar 
movement. The Chicano movement separated from the antiwar movement and 
students turned their energies towards other causes, including environmentalism 
and women‟s liberation. The movement in the Southwest splintered in 1970 and 
the de-escalation of the ground war in 1971 caused it to fade almost completely.    
 The explosion of the GI movement in 1969 caused the military brass to 
redouble its efforts at quelling dissent in the armed forces. GI‟s in San Diego 
noticed an increase in police repression following the creation of a chapter of 
Movement for a Democratic Military. They accused the police of harassment, 
illegal searches and seizures, and entering their meeting places without 
warrants.93 The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Leonard Chapman, Jr.,  
according to the Los Angeles Times, had “declared internal war” against the 
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organization, finding it a serious threat to national security.94 These efforts to 
forcibly disband the organization in turn increased interest in the cities in which it 
was located. A colonel at Camp Pendleton blamed Movement for a Democratic 
Military for inciting race riots after a February incident in which a handful of black 
and white marines came to blows. The San Diego Street Journal and MDM 
together filed a lawsuit in San Diego seeking an immediate end to police abuse 
of powers in attempting to disrupt the activities of both.  
 Frustrated by the lack of apparent success in stopping the war, students 
turned confrontational. Bank of America executives blamed antiwar protestors 
for firebombing a branch in Isla Vista, California, running a full-page 
advertisement in the San Diego Tribune blasting the youths for mindless 
violence. It seemed that students were moving from protest to violent resistance. 
Students retorted that the bank ought to run a full-page advertisement criticizing 
the American government for destroying entire towns in Vietnam with napalm 
and bombs. “Bring the war home, baby,” they taunted.95 This turn towards 
violence pushed many moderate protestors out of the movement or into other 
arenas of activism. 
 Spring actions included nationwide protests April 13-18. At the University 
of Texas, “U.S. Out Now!” events included guerilla theater, GI demonstrations, 
teach-ins, and an anti-ROTC march.96 The ROTC remained on many campuses 
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as a symbol of the connections between the university and the military. Students 
interpreted the ROTC as a weakness in the military training system. One 
hundred cities nationwide participated in the demonstrations. The San Diego 
Citizen‟s Mobilization Committee promoted the theme that money spent on the 
war would be better used at home for education, transportation, and health care. 
”Let‟s start spending money for human life,” they declared, “instead of for human 
death!”97 A representative of the Chicano community, Ed Ruiz, spoke in front of 
the San Diego rally, connecting the deaths of Vietnamese to Chicanos suffering 
in the barrios.98 The crowd stretched for ten blocks.  
 Then, Nixon invaded Cambodia. Nixon claimed on national television, 
“This is not an invasion of Cambodia,” but students were not persuaded.99 Nor 
were the protesters at Kent State University on May 4 when the National Guard 
shot and killed four students. The event stunned the movement. Even the 
nonpolitical hippie newspaper, the Santa Fe Hips Voice, which usually refrained 
from antiwar news, devoted an issue to the shootings and why the war must be 
ended. It headlined, “Kent Victims Opposed to Violence,” and asked, “Who 
guards against the guard?”100 The killings at Kent State mobilized and 
reinvigorated the GI movement and the rest of the antiwar movement, if only for 
a very short time. Throughout the Southwest, military and civilian organizations 
mobilized for protest during Armed Forces Day. Throughout the country, the 
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military cancelled festivities for the Day at twenty-eight bases because of fear of 
antiwar disruptions. Over seven hundred soldiers from Fort Bliss marched in the 
streets of Killeen while GI‟s For Peace demonstrated at the University of Texas - 
El Paso.101  
 Chicanos began holding their own antiwar moratoriums in the Spring of 
1970. An antiwar rally in Santa Fe, according to one “Spanish-American” 
observer was poisoned by the radical Chicanos who were not open-minded to 
strategies of self-determination other than separatism and brown power.102 
Though ostensibly an antiwar demonstration, the open stage became a forum 
for all grievances of Chicanos. Some of the moderate Mexican Americans at the 
rally wrote to the Santa Fe Hips Voice to criticize the Chicanos for advocating 
violence. “The Indians, the blacks, the gays, the hips have all felt the jabs of 
discrimination,” they agreed, but they pointed out the hypocrisy of Chicanos 
advocating aggression to oppose Anglo violence in Vietnam and the Southwest. 
Moderate Mexican Americans rejected the separatist agenda of radical Brown 
Power, arguing that the best way to improve their position was to work within 
liberalism, not apart from it. They agreed that the war negatively affected their 
communities, but argued that separatism would marginalize Mexican Americans 
politically. 
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 In San Diego, the “Moratorio Chicano Contra La Guerra” connected the 
war to the long history of U.S. imperialism in Latin America and the Anglo 
conquest of the American Southwest.103 Some Chicanos advocated guerilla 
warfare against Anglos to reclaim the Southwest, suggesting that it would be 
necessary to mobilize the border towns with their high Chicano populations and 
proximate access to Mexico. Like the Vietnamese fighting American imperialism, 
Chicanos would have the similar advantage of fighting a war in their own 
homeland. The new state they aimed to create was Aztlán, a throwback to the 
mythological birthplace of the Aztecs, and comprised the southwestern states of 
Texas, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. 
  While claiming a fraternal connection to other minorities in America, the 
rhetoric of the San Diego Chicano Moratorium blamed white Americans for the 
injustices perpetrated against la raza. No longer would Chicanos seek white 
political alliances to solve their problems, they claimed. Now, they would take 
responsibility for the care of their own people. The Vietnam War was evidence of 
efforts by whites to eliminate minorities in American and throughout the world, 
they argued: “If anyone doubts this genocidal claim, they only have to look to the 
Red man, the half-brother of the Chicano, to realize that through conscious 
neglect and warfare their population has been cut down to a few thousand.” 
Ostensibly an antiwar protest, the aims of the Moratorium were much larger. It 
was an announcement that la raza had arrived, “the Moratorium is a nation of 
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people rising.” They blamed the hypocrisy of liberalism: “While billions are spent 
on the military-industrial complex, Chicanos are faced with poor housing, 
discriminatory employment, and inferior education. La Raza is faced with 
physical elimination as are the blacks.” Despite the insistence that they would 
band together with blacks, their rhetoric was separatist, like that of many Black 
Power organizations, poisoning the atmosphere for cooperation. Brown Berets in 
San Diego attempted to draw the parallel between their struggle and that of 
blacks, using the Vietnam War as evidence of racial injustice in the United 
States. “Black and Brown is the color of an unemployment line. Black and Brown 
is the color of the Welfare waiting rooms. Black and Brown is the color of the 
pintas. Mostly Black and Brown is the color of the military. Black and Brown, and 
Yellow, is the color of the dead in Vietnam.”104  
 The ascension of Chicano antiwar activity in the late 1960s crested with 
the Chicano Moratorium in Los Angeles on August 29, 1970, a date sealed in 
the memories of California‟s movement participants. The largest ethnic-based 
protest of the Vietnam War, the Moratorium attracted 30,000 mostly-Mexican 
Americans to the streets of East Los Angeles, including participants from across 
the Southwest.105 Los Angeles Sheriff‟s Department deputies, donning riot gear, 
batons, and tear gas launchers, dispersed the crowd in the early afternoon 
following a disturbance at a nearby liquor store. The scuffle provided the 
pretense for the Sheriff‟s Department to end the antiwar rally. Most Mexican 
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Americans left peacefully, but some younger Chicanos fought back with rocks 
and bottles, putting themselves in the paths of swinging batons. 
  The Moratorium ended in disaster when a Sheriff‟s Deputy fired a tear 
gas projectile into a nearby bar, fatally striking Ruben Salazar, a popular 
Mexican American journalist for the Los Angeles Times, in the head. Mexican 
Americans considered Ruben Salazar‟s death a political assassination, 
connected to his opposition of the Vietnam War and representation of minorities 
at the Times.  In the following weeks, Chicanos criticized the Sheriff for 
attempting to “whitewash” the investigation.106 Meanwhile, African American 
leaders in Los Angeles supported the efforts by Chicanos to force federal 
investigations.107 The death connected the two most-salient problems shared by 
blacks and Chicanos: the Vietnam War and police brutality. 
 The strength of the Chicano movement to protest the war ended along 
with the life of Ruben Salazar. The tragedy compelled Regeneración to appeal 
for a “moratorium on moratoriums.”108 The antiwar movement for Chicanos was 
now largely dead. The use of the war as a metaphor for racial injustice at home 
was no longer cultivated. Moderate Mexican Americans ditched the antiwar 
movement, leaving brown power advocates free to pursue separatism and self-
determination. The antiwar movement in the Southwest, which derived its 
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strength from the cooperation of GI‟s, blacks, Chicanos, and students, was now 
largely splintered.   
 By 1971, the antiwar movement had exhausted its effectiveness to 
challenge the Vietnam War. Even as support for the Vietnam War dropped, the 
movement became marginalized by its escalation in confrontational tactics, the 
radicalization of its message, Nixon‟s troop withdrawals, and the explosion of the 
“kaleidoscope of activism” that drew antiwar movement participants into other 
arenas of social activism.109 Though the antiwar movement declined, it was 
already successful in creating a generation of activists who carried the mantle of 
social activism into the seventies.  
 Nationally, the antiwar movement was on the decline, although not as 
precipitously as in the Southwest. Tom Wells argues that the antiwar movement 
weakened because its participants doubted that they were making progress in 
ending the war. This frustration led to an escalation in protest tactics, ultimately 
pushing out its moderate supporters. Many of the most enduring images of the 
movement, though, took place while the movement waned. The Winter Soldier 
investigations, veterans tossing their medals onto the steps of Capitol Hill, and 
the half-million marchers on Washington D.C. occurred in 1971 while the 
movement supposedly declined. In the Southwest, the antiwar movement ended 
largely because Chicanos abandoned it as central to their own political struggle 
following the Chicano Moratorium. Without this important element of support, the 
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movement unraveled, and students and GI‟s pursued their own struggles 
separately.  
 The Chicano movement stopped participating in the mainstream 
movement, but it continued to capitalize on Mexican American military service to 
criticize American society. The June issue of  El Grito del Norte, a Chicano 
journal of art and literature, included an account of the war by a Chicano soldier. 
“The military calls me a Caucasian. The military says that, to the military, there is 
no such thing as white, black, or brown color; we are all the same,” the 
anonymous author claimed, “It doesn‟t say how the racist lifers try to separate us 
so we won‟t unite against them.”110 The United Farm Workers attempted to 
promote its consumer boycott of lettuce by appealing to the GI‟s. As during the 
grape strike, when the Department of Defense bought up massive amounts of 
scab grapes to ship to Vietnam, the department once again bought alarming 
amounts of scab lettuce. One large grower in California under siege by the union 
increased his lettuce sales to the military three-fold.111 Cesar Chavez lambasted 
the strike-breaking power of defense purchases, while the military claimed it was 
neutral on the UFW strike. Many soldiers donned patches and stickers reading 
“Lifers Eat Lettuce,” and editorialized in support of the UFW in GI newspapers. 
 Scholars attempted to unravel the contradiction they noticed whereby 
Mexican Americans privileged military service as a means for social 
advancement but opposed the Vietnam War. An opinion survey in Santa 
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Barbara showed that Mexican Americans were “more troubled by the war than 
Anglo-Americans.”112 Military service as a means for upward mobility continued 
to resonate, yet the Vietnam War decreased in popularity among Mexican 
Americans. The authors of the Santa Barbara study concluded, “Conditions in 
the barrios are aggravated by the inflationary war economy that strikes hardest 
at the many families with incomes below the poverty level.” Chicano protest of 
the war often stemmed from local problems rather than sensitivity to foreign 
policy or concern for the Vietnamese people.  
 April, 1972, antiwar demonstrations in Los Angeles included speakers 
representing a laundry list of causes. Speakers included Rev. Ralph Abernathy 
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Bobby Seale from the Black 
Panther Party, Manuel Gomez of the “anti-imperialist contingent,” Raul Ruiz from 
La Raza Unida, a contingent of Viet Vets, representatives from the United 
Women‟s Contingent, Student Mobe, Asian Americans, and gay and lesbian 
rights organizations. Some observers were encouraged by the wide ranging 
representation of social movements, but others decried the lack of focus on 
Vietnam. Said one observer, “None of the speakers really analyzed the 
economic and political roots of racism and imperialism; nor did they show the 
intimate, functional relationships between the two.”113 Vietnam War 
demonstrations such as this no longer focused on the war itself. Although they 
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could include an array of causes, they no longer sought to connect the war to 
their struggles.    
 The antiwar movement in the Southwest flatlined. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The antiwar movement in the Southwest never had any 100,000-person 
rallies. Students never occupied any buildings of a university. To many it 
appeared as if there was no significant antiwar movement in the Southwest, 
largely because it lacked national television coverage of the important events. 
Historians have continued to ignore the movement in the Southwest. This thesis 
has attempted to provide a better understanding of the antiwar movement by 
demonstrating that there was a vibrant movement where historians have not 
previously looked. Historians have barely scratched the surface of examining the 
antiwar movement outside of San Francisco and the East Coast. Examining the 
movement in the Southwest shows what can be gained from the regional 
perspective. The findings here challenge arguments by historians that the 
antiwar movement was mostly directed by Students for a Democratic Society. 
Students here play an important role, but were only one actor among a grander 
coalition. Historians should take greater care when discussing the antiwar 
movement to emphasize regional and local diversity within the movement. 
 A regional focus allows a synthesis of a vast literature on the student, GI, 
and Chicano movements, a brief moment during which they all converged with 
the purpose of ending the war, if for different reasons. These groups can be 
better understood in relation to each other. Historians of the Chicano movement 
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have mostly focused on the separatist, Brown Power aspects. Early in the 
movement, however, Chicanos realized that they could better achieve their 
political goals by cooperating with blacks, students, and GI‟s to end the war and 
confront the establishment. The Southwest perspective complicates the 
literature of the antiwar movement, and also contributes to a better 
understanding of each of the groups that made it.  
 The movements that spun off the antiwar movement had lasting influence 
in the Southwest. GI‟s were successful in moving the military to create strong 
anti-racism policies and many of the educational programs created during this 
era remain. Many former antiwar protestors participated in the emerging 
environmental movement, which recognized the ecological fragility of the 
Southwest. They redirected their protests of military-industrial complex from the 
Vietnam War to its harm on the environment.  
 Of all the movements, though, the Chicano movement had the greatest 
impact in the Southwest throughout the seventies and beyond. The young men 
that were encouraged to fight for la raza and not in Vietnam took this mission 
seriously. Many antiwar Chicanos joined the political party La Raza Unida, which 
enjoyed some success in city and county elections in South Texas. A report from 
Santa Barbara in 1971 predicted, “The war in Vietnam may fade away, but the 
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struggle in the barrios will go on.”114 Armed with their experiences in the antiwar 
movement, Chicanos were in a better position to assist in the political struggle.  
 Despite efforts by militant Chicanos to emphasize sel-determination and 
separatism from the United States, the military ideal survived the Vietnam War. 
The military remained a place for young men and women to test their mettle, 
escape the barrio, and gain career training. Indeed, in the all-volunteer military, 
Hispanics are still vastly over represented. 
 On January 3, 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were ratified. The war was 
over. But for many activists, the fight for environmental health, women‟s 
liberation, Native American self-determination, and for every other point in the 
kaleidoscope of activism, the struggle was just beginning.   
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